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Abstract 
In the global recession of 2009, exports declined precipitously in 
many countries.  We illustrate with firm-level data for Belgium and 
Peru that the decline was very sudden and almost entirely due to lower 
export sales by existing exporters.  After the recession, exports 
rebounded almost equally quickly and we evaluate whether export 
promotion programs were an effective tool aiding this recovery.  We 
show that firms taking advantage of this type of support did better 
during the crisis, controlling flexibly for systematic differences 
between supported and control firms.  The primary mechanism we 
identify is that supported firms are generally more likely to survive on 
the export market and, in particular, are more likely to continue 
exporting to countries hit by the financial crisis. 
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Executive Summary 
The academic literature as advanced and tested several explanations for the notable decline in 
the volume of international trade during the Great Recession of 2008-2009.  Shocks to both 
demand and trade costs have been suggested as important channels.  There has, however, been 
surprisingly little discussion how governments could help firms cope with the fallout from 
foreign demand or with the increase in trading frictions.   
In this paper we first document for Belgium and Peru that trade volumes rebounded 
remarkably quickly.  By 2010 exports had regained their pre-crisis levels and by 2011 they were 
even back on the pre-crisis trend.  Using firm-level information for both countries, we 
investigate whether export promotion programs played a role in this recovery.  A growing 
literature has documented the success of such programs in raising exports in general and they 
could be a valuable tool to help the private sector recover from a large trade decline as well.   
Most countries now run active export promotion programs to facilitate domestic firms’ entry 
into the export market and support subsequent export sales.  Rather than provide direct subsidies, 
these programs work mainly as an information depository or a way to share fixed information 
acquisition costs between exporters.  They help firms to learn about foreign demand for their 
products, establish relationships with importers, identify promising new distribution channels, 
and overcome administrative or trade frictions such as customs procedures and differences 
between domestic and foreign regulations or product standards. 
The evidence suggests export promotion has indeed been an effective tool to help firms 
survive on the export market.  We show that firms active on the export market in 2006 are more 
likely to continue their export activities during the crisis if they benefitted from export 
promotion support.  For Belgian firms this effect is driven by firms exporting outside  the EU.  
Moreover, firms surviving on the export market tend to export significantly more if they were 
supported.  To control for self-selection of firms into these programs, we control for a wide 
range of observable characteristics and invoke the usual selection-on-observables assumption. 
We confirm the benchmark estimates with a matching estimator and using inverse probability 
weighting to condition more flexibly on the observables.   In terms of absolute magnitudes, the 
mid-point of the range of estimates suggest a 6% to 11%, respectively for Belgium and Peru, 
higher probability of survival on the export market for supported firms and approximately 20% 
to 10% higher exports for surviving exporters. 
We also estimated a specification that includes firm-fixed effects to absorb the effect of a 
constant, unobservable factor.  Estimating the model at the firm-destination level, we verify 
whether supported firms have better export outcomes in destination markets that suffered a 
financial crisis.  The estimates are again supportive and suggest the ability to survive on markets 
most affected by the crisis rather than higher exports to such markets, is the primary mechanism 
for the superior performance of supported firms. 
1. Introduction 
The precipitous decline of international trade relative to GDP in the 2008-2009 recession has 
received quite some attention in the recent academic literature.  Shocks to both demand and 
trade costs have been suggested as important channels (Eaton et al., 2011). Among the most 
prominent explanations for the great trade collapse are worsening credit conditions (Chor and 
Manova, 2012), input demand linkages between sectors coupled with trading frictions (Bems, 
Johnson and Yi, 2011; Bussière et al., 2011) or reduced expenditure on manufactured goods in 
general (Behrens, Corcos and Mion, 2013).  The literature has provided some insights to 
understand the mechanisms for and explain the magnitude of the trade decline, but there has 
been less attention on formulating appropriate policy responses.  Initially, there was a fear that 
countries would raise protectionist barriers, but by and large this did not materialize (Bown and 
Crowley, 2012).  There has been surprisingly little discussion how governments could help 
firms cope with the fallout from foreign demand and the increase in trading frictions. 
In this paper we investigate whether a targeted government program of export promotion 
support can help countries restore their pre-crisis export level.  A growing literature has 
documented the success of such programs in raising exports generally.  It is conceivable they 
are a valuable tool to help the private sector recover from a large trade decline, as experienced 
by many firms in 2009.  The vast majority of countries now run active export promotion 
programs to facilitate domestic firms’ entry into the export market and support subsequent 
export sales (Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton, 2010; Volpe Martincus, 2010).  Rather than 
provide direct subsidies, these programs work mainly as an information depository or a way to 
share fixed information acquisition costs between exporters.  They help firms to learn about 
foreign demand for their products, establish relationships with importers, identify promising 
new distribution channels, and overcome administrative or trade frictions such as customs 
procedures and differences between domestic and foreign regulations or product standards.  
We consider export promotion only playing a role of ‘information broker and facilitator.’  
Many countries operate separate programs that provide direct export subsidies, trade credit and 
insurance, or state guarantees, which played a role in temporary lifting liquidity constraints or 
cushion increases in the cost of credit during the crisis.  For example, Felbermayr, Heiland and 
Yalcin (2012) study a program of state credit guarantees in Germany that helped sustain export 
levels.  Effects were higher when market risk was high and at times when refinancing conditions 
were tight, as during the financial crisis.  More generally, exports are sensitive to financial 
shocks as international trade tends to involve higher default risk and liquidity problems.  Thus, 
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) showed that an important determinant of firm-level exports during 
a crisis is the health of exporters’ financial institutions.   
The latter types of interventions tend to distort competition and in that way impose a burden 
on other countries.  Especially in the context of the great recession, subsidy programs or other 
forms of financial support have more of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ flavor.  They are more likely to 
raise concerns by trading partners as firms from all countries faced a collapse in global demand.  
The export promotion programs we study do not impose costs on other countries as they merely 
aim to reduce transaction costs by reducing information asymmetries and alleviate uncertainty 
(Copeland, 2008).  Aggregate market uncertainty has been particularly relevant during the great 
recession compared to milder downturns.  In the absence of negative externalities on trading 
partners, export promotion is less likely to distort international competition and generate 
objections.  Moreover, as all exporters have access to these services, domestic competition is 
not distorted either.  
Theoretical models of international trade provide some insights into the channels through 
which export promotion can help dampen business cycle effects.  In the canonical 
heterogeneous firm model (see Melitz and Redding, 2014), only firms with a productivity level 
that exceeds a threshold can profitably enter the export market.  The destination-specific 
productivity thresholds are increasing in bilateral variable costs and fixed costs of trade which 
export promotion can help lower.  For example, international trade involves higher transaction 
times due to additional paperwork, preparation of goods for international shipping, customs 
procedures, or simply longer transit times (Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2010; Volpe Martincus, 
Carballo, and Graziano, 2015).  Increased uncertainty about global demand and tighter financial 
constraints during the crisis are likely to raise these costs further.  In addition, lower domestic 
demand will force firms to operate at lower capacity utilization and sacrifice some scale 
economies.  With lower effective productivity, it is even harder to reach the productivity 
threshold to operate profitably in foreign markets and some firms will exit, at least temporarily.  
If some of the fixed costs of exporting are sunk (Roberts and Tybout, 1997), liquidity 
constraints can induce wasteful export market churn.  To the extent that export promotion helps 
firms, at least temporarily, avoid some fixed costs, they are more likely to survive on the export 
market.  A recent study by Eaton et al. (2014) provides evidence that surviving in a foreign 
market requires continuous search effort for new clients.  As existing partners go bankrupt 
during a crisis, information provision by export promotion agencies also becomes more valuable. 
We make three contributions to the export promotion literature.  First, ours is the first paper 
to analyze the impact of export promotion during the great trade collapse.  In line with previous 
studies, we exploit detailed information on export transactions observed by firm, product and 
destination market.  A second contribution is to evaluate similar export promotion policies for 
two economies, Belgium and Peru, with a different form of integration in international markets 
and different comparative advantages.  It is possible that this influences the effectiveness of 
export promotion activities.  Belgian firms are strongly integrated in the EU economy—about 
50% of exports go to its immediate neighbors—and they mostly export differentiated, 
manufacturing goods.  In contrast, Peruvian firms export primarily to faraway places—fewer 
than 20% of exports remain in Latin America or the Caribbean—and the national export 
portfolio is dominated by mining products, basic manufacturers, and agricultural or food 
products.  Third, we do not only study the impact of export promotion on firms’ level of exports, 
but look specifically whether it helps firms to survive on the export market in general or in 
destinations affected by a financial crisis in particular. 
A first descriptive analysis illustrates that the export decline in both countries during the 
recession was very sudden, limited mostly to 2009 and 2010, and mostly due to lower firm-level 
sales on existing export markets.  Therefore, we use firm-level total export as our primary 
dependent variable.  Further preliminary evidence also suggests that self-selection into export 
support cannot be ruled out and has to be taken into account to identify causal effects in the 
performance regression.  We address this by including a rich set of control variables in the 
regression, but also rely on more sophisticated estimators from the treatment evaluation 
literature, i.e. a matching estimator and inverse-probability weighting.  
We find that export promotion has positive effects on firm-level exports over the crisis and 
that the magnitude of effects is rather similar for the two countries.  The extensive destination 
margin is the primary channel responsible for the superior firm-level export performance.  
Supported firms export more because they are significantly more likely to remain active in 
destinations most affected by the financial crisis, even though their export volumes are not 
significantly different from those of control firms that manage to survive in the same 
destinations.  On this latter dimension, however, repeated support did make a difference.  Firms 
receiving multiple years of assistance did export more even within destinations hit by the crisis, 
although highly intensive use of the promotion services within a year did not generate similar 
benefits.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  We start in Section 2 with a review of 
the existing evidence on the export-boosting success of trade promotion programs, both from a 
macro and a micro perspective.  In Section 3 we provide some background information on the 
activities of the two agencies we study.  In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss the data and document 
the evolution of exports and the use of export support services over the crisis. The empirical 
framework to study whether the quick recovery of exports is systematically related to export 
promotion is presented in Section 6, followed by our estimates in Section 7.  We conclude in 
Section 8 with some policy conclusions. 
2. What do we know about the effects of export promotion? 
2.1 Defining export promotion 
Governments around the world use various policy instruments to foster their firms’ exports.1 
Leaving aside macroeconomic measures such as exchange rate policy, some of these 
instruments provide firms directly with financial resources or help them indirectly to cope with 
a credit crunch.  These include direct subsidies associated with export requirements (Helmers 
and Trofimenko, 2013; Defever and Riaño, 2014) and export credit guarantees (Abraham and 
Dewit, 2000; Egger and Url, 2006; Moser et al., 2008; Felbermayr and Yacin, 2013).  Some 
other policies that subsidize firms directly do not target exports, but are likely to affect them, for 
                                                     
1
 Private sector associations may also assist firms in selling abroad (Hiller, 2012). 
example production subsidies (Girma et al., 2009), support to invest in technology, training, and 
physical capital (Görg et al., 2008), VAT reimbursement rules (Gourdon et al., 2014), and 
preferential regulation and taxation in economic development zones (Schminke and Van 
Biesebroeck, 2013).  
In addition, there are “soft” public interventions aimed to stimulate exports.  Two important 
forms are, first, general economic diplomacy, where governments rely on international relations 
through permanent foreign missions such as embassies and consulates or state visits (Rose, 
2007; Nitsch, 2007; Head and Ries, 2009; Veenstra et al., 2011; Creusen and Lejour, 2012; 
Fergusson and Forslid, 2014), and, second, explicit export promotion programs (Lederman et al., 
2010; Volpe Martincus, 2010).
2
   
In this paper, we focus on the last instrument: support by export promotion agencies.  It can 
be defined as a set of activities to help firms overcome internationalization obstacles, for 
example by providing data on the general export process and on specific markets and overseas 
business contacts, by disseminating information on domestic firms’ products and services, by 
assisting in the preparation and follow-up of firms’ participation in international marketing 
events such as fairs and missions, or by co-financing travel costs through matching grants.   
These activities are likely to reduce the fixed costs that firms incur when penetrating a new 
foreign market and when searching for new customers in existing export markets.  They address 
a market failure in the form of information externalities.  As economic transactions resulting 
from successful searches reveal valuable information for third firms, they generate positive 
spillovers.  If only part of the potential benefits accrue to the firms investing in searches, 
aggregate investment to explore business opportunities will be sub-optimally low as will be the 
diversification of exports (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
It is worth mentioning that some support activities are carried out by foreign offices of 
export promotion agencies which can be located within embassies and consulates or even by the 
diplomatic representations themselves. This introduces an identification challenge. Note, 
however, that export promotion organizations are typically highly specialized, often managed 
according to private sector practices, and employ personnel with a background in international 
trade.  This differs from embassies or consulates which do not always have a trade section and 
sometimes lack staff with the necessary business expertise or the time and incentives to assist 
exporters. Especially for developing countries, coordination between export promotion 
organizations and foreign diplomatic missions that are supposed to assists them in their work is 
generally weak (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
 The effectiveness of export promotion has been evaluated in several ways.  Researchers 
have relied on measures of export promotion at the agency level, in the form of available 
financial resources or the extent of the network of offices abroad, or at the beneficiary level, by 
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 There are several papers that show the importance of access to financing for exporting (e.g., Amiti 
and Weinstein, 2012; Paravisini et al., 2014; and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2014). 
observing which firms take advantage of these programs.  Table 1 includes an exhaustive list of 
empirical evaluations that cover approximately the last two decades.  We first review analyses 
with a macro perspective that relate export promotion organizations’ budget and network of 
offices to export volumes. Next we turn to studies with a micro perspective that evaluate the 
impact of export promotion support on various dimensions of firm-level export performance.  
[Include Table 1 approximately here] 
2.2 The macro perspective 
2.2.1 Financial resources devoted to export promotion 
A few studies examine the effects of trade promotion on trade outcomes by exploiting variation 
in expenditures.  At the regional level, Coughlin and Cartwright (1987) report that exports of 
US states covary positively with the states’ export promotion budget.  In particular, each dollar 
increase in promotion expenditures is associated with $432 additional manufacturing exports.  
In a similar study for Argentina, Castro and Saslavsky (2009) conclude that each dollar invested 
in export promotion translates into $240 addition foreign sales for the average province.  In 
contrast, exploiting variation in the export support budget across US states normalized by the 
number of in-state firms, Bernard and Jensen (2004) find no systematic relationship with the 
export propensity of firms from each state, once a number of firm-level characteristics are 
controlled for.  They conjecture that the lack of effect is the result of agencies targeting small 
and medium-sized firms, which rarely export anywhere.  
At the national level, Lederman et al. (2010) use a sample of export promotion organizations 
from 103 countries and show that their budgets are positively and statistically significantly 
related to higher national exports.  Their benchmark regressions show an elasticity of 12%.  In 
absolute terms, this estimate implies that, for the median agency, each dollar spent on trade 
promotion raises exports by $40.   
While these numbers are useful as a first approximation for the relationship between 
resources assigned to export promotion and export performance, the exact estimates should be 
read with extreme caution because the identification of such relationship is subject to major data 
and methodological difficulties (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
2.2.2 Network of foreign offices 
In the spirit of Rose (2007), several studies investigate the effects of the presence or the number 
of foreign offices operated by export promotion agencies on both country and region-level 
export outcomes.  Volpe Martincus et al. (2010, 2011) utilize bilateral product-level trade data 
and information on the location of branches of trade promotion organizations for several Latin 
American and Caribbean countries over the period 1995-2004 to show that the presence of these 
branches is associated with higher exports primarily along the product extensive margin and 
particularly of differentiated goods.  Using data from Spain for the years 1995-2011, Gil-Pareja 
et al. (2008, 2014) arrive at a similar conclusion for the export promotion offices established 
abroad by Spanish regions.  In particular, they find that the export-enhancing effect can mainly 
be traced to an expansion in the number of products and the number of transactions per product.  
Interestingly, according to their results, the effect increases with the age of the office, a 
plausible proxy for its experience in a destination.   
In the same vein, Hayakawa et al. (2011) find large effects from bureaus of Japan’s and 
South Korea’s trade promotion organizations.  The presence of an office in a destination raises 
exports by a similar amount as the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement with that country, a 
remarkable finding.  Finally, Cassey (2014) exploits the location of overseas trade-support 
offices that individual US states have established.  In total, his sample contains 228 offices 
covering 31 countries, with the most active state (Pennsylvania) operating 17 offices.  He 
estimates that an overseas branch lowers the variable export cost by 0.04% to 0.10% which 
makes them cost-effective if the annual export volume to a country exceeds $850 million. 
2.3 The micro perspective: Exploiting information on firm-level support 
2.3.1 The impact on export outcomes  
A large number of studies have directly evaluated the ability of national export promotion 
agencies to raise exports of their clients.  Researchers working with data from different 
countries have matched individual firm information on trade transactions to client registries 
from the aforementioned agencies, making possible impact evaluation studies at the firm level. 
Various statistical methods from the treatment evaluation literature have been used to construct 
an appropriate benchmark for treated firms.  Following Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) 
many studies have used a matching difference-in-differences estimator, relying on propensity 
score matching to construct an appropriate control group.  Other studies, for example, Van 
Biesebroeck, Yu and Chen (2015) and Volpe Martincus et al. (2012), use the propensity score to 
construct weights and implement a double-robust estimator. 
Table 1 list all studies using firm-level evidence on export promotion organized by country.  
In total, 21 studies covering 16 countries are listed, almost all conducted in the last decade.  
Studying the intensive margin of trade—i.e. the impact on a client’s total export level—is easier 
than studying the effect at the extensive firm margin—i.e. whether support draws new firms into 
the export market—as the latter requires information on the universe of potential exporters.  
Most studies only observe outcomes for existing exporters, but even then researchers can look 
for effects at the product and the destination extensive margins.  Helping firms to diversify their 
destination or product markets is often an explicit goal of the agencies. 
It is impossible to summarize all findings, but it is fair to say that almost all studies find a 
positive and significant effect of firm-level export promotion support on firm-level exports.  
Further, the size of the estimated effects tend to be larger when the type of firm or the type of 
trade is likely to face more severe information problems (Volpe Martincus, 2010).  
In particular, trade promotion is estimated to have different effects on export activities that 
are confronted with different degrees of information incompleteness. Estimated effects are 
particularly large at the extensive firm margin, when firms attempt to venture in foreign markets 
for the first time (Cruz, 2014; Schminke and Van Biesebroeck, 2015; Lederman, Olarreaga and 
Zavala, 2015; Mion and Muûls, 2015), or when firms try to enter an entirely new country or 
product market (Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2008, 2011; Schminke and Van Biesebroeck, 
2015).
3
 Van Biesebroeck et al. (2015) is one exception in this regard, as they find stronger 
effects at the intensive margin.  Still, even an intensive margin change might originate from an 
extensive margin expansion of a firm’s customer base (Bernard et al., 2013; Carballo et al., 
2013).  
As different firms are likely to require different forms of assistance, it does not come as a 
surprise that many studies document heterogeneous effects by firm and product types. For 
example, more complex goods are likely to face more severe information barriers, consistent 
with larger estimated gains for differentiated goods (Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2012).  
Smaller firms with less exposure to international markets are also likely to face greater 
difficulties obtaining the necessary trading information, consistent with higher estimated 
benefits of export assistance to small firms (Munch and Schaur, 2015).  Finally, some evidence 
suggests that bundled support services provided throughout the exporting process, e.g. 
accompany firms from the early business contacts to the establishment of commercial 
relationships, are more effective than isolated actions, e.g. only providing a matching grants to 
participate in an international mission (Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2010).  
A recent study by Fernandes et al. (2015) suggests that export promotion effects may be not 
durable. They show that previously supported and control firms achieve the same export 
performance after a number of years.  It should be noted, however, that this result is so far based 
on a single application and the Tunisian FAMEX initiative differed in some respects from the 
operations of traditional export promotion agencies.
4
  Further research is needed to establish 
external validity.
5
  Our results below show that export promotion helps firms survive on the 
export market, a necessary condition for long-term effects.  
2.3.2 Beyond export outcomes and beyond export promotion  
Mainly due to data limitations, several relevant policy questions are still unanswered.  It is 
important to keep in mind that these programs aim to facilitate economic activities believed to 
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 UKTI, the UK trade and investment promotion organization, has a formal economic and research 
team that carries out and commissions evaluation studies, which can be found in their website. 
4
 Contrary to most programs, export promotion was outsourced to third parties selected by the 
participating firms themselves.  It is not obvious that firms with no or little export experience would be 
able to select an appropriate service provider.  Moreover, quality differences in these providers’ services 
could translate into heterogeneity in the trade promotion treatment and reduce estimated persistence.  
5
 In fact, there is already evidence on the contrary (Carballo, 2012). 
generate productivity growth and employment expansion.
6
  By increasing foreign sales, trade 
promotion might improve firms’ performance more broadly.  Munch and Schaur (2015) and 
Rincón-Aznar, Riley and Rosso (2015) make a first step towards assessing whether or not this is 
the case. Using firm-level data from Denmark, Munch and Schaur (2015) show that export 
promotion positively affects sales, employment, and worker productivity, particularly in smaller 
firms and after an adjustment period. Rincón-Aznar, Riley and Rosso (2015) carry out a similar 
analysis for the UK and conclude that such promotion has a positive impact on firms’ turnover 
growth and, to a more limited extent, on labor productivity growth and seems to make a 
difference at the aggregate level.  
Evaluations of export promotion have focused on a single program, while firms often receive 
assistance in several domains.  These other forms of assistance can also affect export outcomes 
and interact with trade promotion.  For instance, innovation subsidies might lead to improved 
production processes and higher productivity or to new product varieties that facilitate entry in 
foreign markets.  Álvarez et al. (2014) investigate the existence of complementarities between 
export and innovation promotion programs in shaping Chilean firms’ export performance over 
the 2002-2010 period.  They find that firms which previously participated in the innovation 
promotion program were able to benefit more from subsequent trade promotion help than firms 
only using trade support or using both programs simultaneously (thus not allowing innovation to 
mature).  In other words, the sequencing of these programs mattered to maximize their synergies.   
In closing this section, we should mention that, albeit there are some knowledge gaps, there 
is a substantial amount of research on the effects of export promotion on export outcomes. 
Similarly, there is an emerging literature explaining the great trade collapse following the global 
financial crisis (Baldwin, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; and Bems et al., 2013).  
However, there is no connection yet between these two literatures.  We do not know whether 
and, if so, to what extent trade promotion contributed to firms' adjustment to the financial 
turmoil.  This is precisely the link that the next analysis aims to explore. 
3. Export support agencies 
3.1 PROMPERU 
PROMPERU is Peru’s national public export promotion organization and is headquartered in 
Lima.
7
  Its highest governing body is the Board of Directors Directive Board, which is chaired 
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 In particular, the empirical literature has clearly established that productivity leads to exports, and 
there might even be feedback effects from exporting (e.g., Castellani, 2002; Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Van 
Biesebroeck, 2005; De Loecker, 2007). 
7
 PROMPERU employees manage six regional offices within Peru which provide local companies 
with basic training and general information on the export process and foreign markets.  In addition, it has 
regional information centers that are staffed and managed by employees of local governments or business 
associations, which provide information on marketing, prices of products with overseas demand, profiles 
by the minister of foreign trade and tourism and is composed of representatives from entities of 
the public and private sector, such as the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, the Exporters Association and Peru’s Society of Foreign Trade.  In 
addition to the board, PROMPERU’s organizational structure consists of a general secretary and 
two divisions, one for promoting exports and one for tourism. 
Currently, the agency’s budget is $76.8 million.  Annual resources available for the export 
promotion division are $18.6 million as promoting tourism absorbs a large fraction of the total 
budget.  Most of the budget is provided directly by the government.  As of September 2015 
PROMPERU had 380 employees of which 94 are with the export division.   This division has 
units responsible for market intelligence, capacity building (export development), and trade 
promotion. Many employees have previous experience in foreign trade.
8
  
PROMPERU’s main goal is to contribute to the internationalization of Peruvian firms by 
fostering their penetration of foreign markets and consolidating their positions in these markets. 
In pursuing this goal, the organization provides firms with multiple services.  It trains 
inexperienced firms on the export process, marketing, and negotiations; performs and 
disseminates analyses on country and product market trends; provides specific information on 
trade opportunities abroad as well as specialized counseling and technical assistance on how to 
take advantage of these opportunities; coordinates and supports (and sometimes co-finances) 
firms’ participation in international trade missions or fairs and, importantly, arranges meetings 
with potential foreign buyers; organizes these kind of trade events; and sponsors the creation of 
consortia of firms aiming to strengthen their competitive position in external markets. 
3.2 Flanders Investment and Trade (FIT) 
In Belgium, export promotion is organized in three regional, government-funded agencies.  We 
use information from the Flemish agency, Flanders Investment & Trade (FIT).  They serve 
firms located in Flanders and Brussels which account for more than 80% of Belgian goods trade.  
If some firms in our sample receive support from one of the other two agencies, it will mitigate 
the effects we estimate.
9
 
FIT has its headquarters in Brussels, regional offices in the five provincial capitals and field 
offices in approximately 90 locations abroad.  Its total budget in 2009 was €56.3 million.  Most 
of it, 86 per cent, came directly from the Flemish government, with fee income from services 
covering around €3 million. Its largest expense is maintaining the network of offices in Belgium 
                                                                                                                                                           
of products with greater demand abroad, and export procedures and tax regimes; and organize training 
activities (Volpe Martincus, 2010). 
8
 We thank Carlos Diaz from PROMPERU for providing up-to-date budget and employment figures. 
9
 We obtained comparable support information from Brussels Invest & Export, the agency only 
serving firms from the Brussels-Capital region.  We did not use it in the analysis as the sample period is 
shorter and they focus primarily on trade in services for which we lack detailed information. We did 
exclude firms working with both agencies, as described in the data section. 
and abroad with the corresponding personnel costs. Almost one quarter of the budget, €13.5 
million in 2009, is directed towards subsidies directly linked to a business trip or participation in 
a fair. The average subsidy is quite limited, at approximately €2,000 per request. 
FIT has provided us with detailed information on the intensity and the nature of interactions 
with each of its clients, potential or current exporters located in Flanders or Brussels.  It breaks 
down the support it provides to firms into four types of promotion instruments.  In order of 
importance, as considered by FIT itself, they interact with firms on actions, questions, subsidies, 
and communications.   
The category ‘actions’ comprises activities outside day to day support.  They mainly include 
events that FIT organizes to help firms access markets abroad, such as organizing information 
seminars in Brussels, helping firms to participate in a trade fair, organize a meeting with foreign 
buyers, or themselves organize prospection tours or trade missions.  ‘Questions’ are requests for 
information that involve some research by FIT employees (located domestically or abroad).  
They cover a range of interactions where companies need information about markets or 
potential partners, ask for help setting up an appointment schedule on a business trip or when 
prospecting a foreign market.  Questions are generally transmitted to the field office in the 
concerned country.  
‘Subsidies’ are all forms of financial incentives given to individual companies, mostly co-
payments to support foreign trips.  They also include capital good subsidies and feasibility 
studies which used to be in the realm of development aid.  This category is targeted to small and 
medium-sized firms.  Finally, ‘communication’ is the leftover category covering the remainder 
of interactions  between FIT and client firms.  It is chosen in the system when the other three 
categories do not fit.  Examples are confirmations of a lunch appointment with the CEO, a 
reference to a local consultant, or submission of a transcript of a FIT lecture about international 
entrepreneurship.  
For each of the four promotion instruments we observe the frequency that each firm used 
FIT services between 2002 and 2011, but not which export destination the firm was targeting.  
PROMPERU provides similar types of support, distinguishing between three categories: 
missions, questions, and other.  Unfortunately, the PROMPERU data we received only indicates 
whether a firm is supported, not the type of support it received.  Trade missions and 
participation in trade fairs tend to play a much larger role than in the operations of FIT.   
4. Data 
The literature has only analyzed the average impact of export promotion services, irrespective of 
the business cycle.  It seems plausible, however, that the demand for these services and perhaps 
even their usefulness are enhanced during cyclical downturns.  To investigate this possibility, 
we use information on the export performance and the incidence of support at the firm level for 
Belgium and Peru.  Both countries are relatively small economies, but Belgium’s share of 
exports in GDP is much higher than Peru’s, at respectively 80% versus 27% in 2008, the year 
before the crisis.   
For both countries we have access to information on all trade transactions for individual 
firms, broken down by country destination and 8-digit product.  For Belgium, we aggregate the 
monthly information to the annual level; for Peru, the information is only available at the yearly 
interval.  In the case of Belgium, the reporting threshold on export flows differs by destination.  
Exports to destinations outside the EU are recorded at the firm-product-month level for all 
export flows that exceed a value of €1,000 or a weight of 1,000 kg—in practice even lower 
trade flows are often observed.  In contrast, firms are only required to report their within-EU 
exports if the combined value across all EU countries exceeds a threshold, which was €250,000 
until 2005 but raised to €1 million in 2006.  If this is the case, firms report their exports 
separately for all product-country pairs. 
We also observe which firms benefit from support activities of the respective national export 
promotion agencies, FIT which covers firms in Flanders, the largest region in Belgium, and 
PROMPERU in Peru.  This type of support activities takes many forms, such as providing local 
market information, subsidies for foreign market prospecting, helping firms resolve specific 
transaction problems, or facilitating participation in industry events.  We provided more detailed 
information on the type of services in the previous section and will describe how their use 
evolved over the recession below. 
The information from these two data sources is readily matched at the firm-year level using a 
unique firm identifier.  For Belgium we observe the trade information over the entire 1998-2013 
period and export support over 2001-2011.  For Peru, the data covers the 2000-2012 period.  To 
concentrate on the same time period in both countries and work with a sample that had 
consistent reporting thresholds, most of the analysis is limited to 2006-2011.  This period is also 
ideal to focus on the effectiveness of export support specifically during the economic crisis, 
which reduced trade flows primarily in 2009 and 2010.
10
  
After merging the two data sources for each country, we obtain an unbalanced panel of firms.  
For Belgium, there are 50,581 unique firms and 144,045 firm-year observations in the 2006-
2011 period.  For Peru the corresponding statistics are 22,747 and 49,197.  Table 2 shows the 
breakdown by export and support status.  For Belgium, 13% of exporters receive support, while 
55% of firms that receive support are exporters.  While the number of exporters declined 
slightly over the sample period, we do see an uptick in the number of firms receiving support 
during the crisis years 2009 and 2010.  For Peru, a slightly smaller fraction of exporters (10%) 
receive support, but many fewer firms that receive support are exporters (only 29%).  The vast 
majority of these unsuccessful clients only receive support in a single year. 
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 The datasets used in this paper extend the sample periods used in the work of Schminke and Van 
Biesebroeck (2015) for Belgium and Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) for Peru. 
[Include Table 2 approximately here] 
5. Exports and export support over the crisis 
5.1 Evolution of exports over the crisis 
Before we explore the relationship between export promotion activities and exports, we 
document the evolution of exports over the crisis and show which dimensions of export 
performance were most affected.  This will provide some insight into the type of firms that were 
affected most and for which firms support might be particularly valuable. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of aggregate exports in billions of euros or dollars, which 
highlights the sudden export collapse in both countries relative to the trend rate of growth.  In all 
figures and tables, we show results for Belgium on the left and for Peru on the right.  Equally 
remarkable as the sudden reduction in exports at the onset of the recession in 2009 is the rapid 
recovery back to trend afterwards.  In Belgium the export decline in 2009, relative to trend 
growth, was 0.22 log-points and in Peru it was 0.24.  While GDP was mostly flat after the 
recession, barely re-starting growth from the lower level, aggregate exports experienced two 
years of far above trend growth rates to make up the lost ground. In both countries, exports were 
back at their 2008 level by 2010 and by 2011 they were even ahead of the quadratic trend, as if 
the recession never happened.  Our objective is to investigate what role export promotion played 
in this recovery. 
[Include Figure 1 approximately here] 
To further illustrate the evolution over the crisis, we plot for a number of variables the 
residual from a regression (in logarithms) on a linear time trend over the 2006-2013 (Belgium) 
or 2006-2012 (Peru) periods.  The two crisis years, 2009 and 2010, are omitted when 
determining the trend.  When relevant, we report the average growth rate of the variable over 
the period, but the lines in the different panels of Figure 2 are always normalized by the trend.  
They show the deviation and illustrate the depth and duration of the trade collapse.  In the 
different panels, the change in aggregate exports is decomposed into separate adjustment 
margins. 
In the top panel of Figure 2, we separately show the change in the number of exporters 
(dashed line) and the evolution of average exports per firm (solid line).  In both countries, the 
trade reduction was primarily due to lower exports per firm rather than fewer firms exporting.  
In Belgium, the number of exporters was falling by an average of 2.5% per year over the full 
2006-2013 period and this downward trend did become somewhat more pronounced between 
2008 and 2011.  Exports per firm, in contrast, switched from an average annual growth rate of 
7.5% to a sudden drop of 22% in 2009.  In Peru, the different evolution of the two lines is even 
more pronounced.  The number of exporters was growing gradually over the entire period, while 
the strong growth in average exports per firm contracted briefly in 2009, but recovered very 
quickly. 
[Include Figure 2 approximately here] 
The second panel separately shows the evolution of the number of product markets, export 
destinations and the average firm-level sales within each product-destination market.  Each 
variable is aggregated across firms and then purged from the time trend as described earlier.  
The trade reduction is primarily due to a within-firm adjustment on the intensive margin: lower 
exports by market.  Only in Peru is there a reduction as well in the number of products exported, 
but the decline is much less pronounced than the intensive margin change.  This is consistent 
with the evidence in Haddad, Harrison and Hausman (2010) for a broader range of countries. 
Alternatively, one could trace the evolution of the same three variables—number of markets, 
number of products, and exports per market—at the firm level without aggregating.  Using a full 
set of year dummies in a regression that includes firm-fixed effects captures these growth rates.  
In Belgium, the average firm-level patterns we obtain with this alternative procedure mimic the 
aggregate evolutions almost perfectly.  In Peru, however, the firm-level regressions show a less 
pronounced drop in exports by market for individual firms, although the within-market change 
is still the primary adjustment mechanism.  The export reduction to individual markets was less 
uniformly shared by all Peruvian firms. 
The third panel shows the difference in trade adjustment by exporter size.  In Belgium, firms 
that are observed to export on average less than €1 million per year experienced a longer 
crisis.
11
  Their exports bottom out at the same level as for larger exporters, a fall of 0.22 log-
points in both cases, but this only happens by 2011.  Larger exporters experience the entire 
decline in a single year, 2009, and by 2011 they are back at trend.  For small exporters, the 
export decline is more gradual, but the bounce back is somewhat stronger.   
In the case of Peru, where the threshold for small exporters is set at US$1 million per year, 
the trade decline and bounce-back is also more sudden for larger exporters, while small 
exporters still show below trend exports in 2010 and 2011.  In contrast with the Belgian 
situation, the maximum export decline for small Peruvian exporters is notably less pronounced, 
at 0.15 log-points compared with a 0.24 decline for large exporters.
12
  Note, however, that small 
and large firms in Peru appear to have a similar export experience if we use employment to 
define the two groups (we do not observe employment in the Belgian dataset).  It could simply 
be that the lesser decline for low-volume exporters reflects their lower export market exposure.  
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 Note that for the vast majority of these small exporters only their extra-EU exports are observed and 
they could make additional exports up to the €1 million reporting threshold intra-EU.   
12
 A comparable analysis for Chilean firms also shows a more gradual and less pronounced export 
decline for small exporters.  The difference is even larger with the average small exporter experiencing 
only one third of the decline of a typical large exporter. 
In Belgium, the different experience of small and large exporters could also be related to 
different export destinations.  The observed exports for the vast majority of small exporters only 
cover destinations outside the EU, due to the high reporting threshold within the EU.  The 
graphs in the bottom panel of Figure 2, however, suggest that extra-EU exports start declining 
slightly earlier, bottom out slightly lower, but recover at the same rate as within-EU exports.  
Similarly for Peru, small exporters export more within the Latin American and Caribbean region, 
but regional exports declined more pronouncedly. 
While the crisis was concentrated in 2009 and the recovery was very swift, the severity of 
the export decline did vary across sectors and destinations.  It is useful to keep in mind that the 
economies of Belgium and Peru and their average export portfolios do differ.  In particular, 
Peruvian exports contain much less finished manufactured products and are rather concentrated.  
Mining products and non-metal basic manufactures account for more than half of all Peruvian 
exports.  Its top 5 sectors, out of a total of 17, cover 82% of aggregate exports.  Belgian exports 
are dominated by finished manufactured goods and less concentrated, with its 5 most important 
sectors only accounting for 47% of aggregate exports.
13
 
On the destination side, the reverse pattern holds. Belgium is strongly embedded in a broader 
EU production network, which accounts for 76% of its total exports over this period.  48% of 
the total is even confined to its four immediate neighbors.  The fast-growing BRICs countries 
and other large developing economies receive less than 8% of Belgian exports.  In contrast, 
Peruvian export markets are highly diversified with approximately 19% of exports going to 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 17% to the United States, 18% to the EU, 15% to China, and 
8% to Japan and South Korea combined. 
5.2 Export support over the crisis: some facts 
We next show how the use of export promotion support from the two agencies has evolved over 
the crisis in Figure 3.
14
  The black solid line shows the number of firms that draw on these 
services in each year.  In Belgium, the number of individual firms supported rose from 3,752 in 
2006 to 4,577 in 2011.  It increased gradually as the crisis hit and topped out in 2010, 22% 
above the level of 2006.  The general pattern is similar for Peru, but the 50% increase from 2006 
to 2009 is much more pronounced and largely predates the observed export decline. 
[Include Figure 3 approximately here] 
The dashed line shows the number of new firms that receive support.  It only counts firms 
not supported in 2006 in the first year we observe them using these services.  From 2007 to 
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 The most important export categories for Belgium are mineral fuel and four types of finished 
manufactured goods: pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, plastic products, and metal articles. 
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 For Belgium, information for 2011 only covers the first three quarters.  Annual use statistics are 
scaled up to reflect the entire year. 
2008, the number of new clients declined in Belgium, but it is likely that some of the “new 
clients” in 2007 were existing clients that simply skipped using the service in 2006, the first 
year of our data.  The slight increase in new FIT clients from 2008 to 2010 is likely to be more 
reliable, but the 7% increase from 1,681 to 1,797 is rather modest.  For Peru, the number of new 
clients increased in 2008 and similar over-counting in 2007 is likely to understate the increase.  
From 2008 onwards, the number of new clients unambiguously declined. The adverse 
international trade environment in 2008-2010 seems to have convinced many firms to postpone 
their foreign expansion plans. 
For Belgium, we observe not only whether a firm uses the service in a particular year, but 
also the total number of activities it participated in.  Firms can draw on each type of services 
more than once a year and most clients do.  The solid grey line in Figure 3 shows the evolution 
for the sum of activities across all firms.  This total usage was 6% higher in 2009 than in 2006, 
but declined quickly as the crisis subsided.  The average number of support instances over the 
sample period was 5.5 times per firm, falling gradually from 6.0 in 2006 and 2007 to 4.7 in 
2010 and 2011.  As FIT attracted more marginal, low-use clients, the number of unique firms 
supported (in black) increased more strongly than the total number of support instances (in grey). 
Again only for Belgium we even observe the date of support and the dotted line shows the 
evolution of total support at a quarterly frequency.  It reveals that the use of export promotion 
services is rather seasonal, with a peak in the first quarter of the year.  It also reveals that the 
increase over the crisis is somewhat masked in the annual data.  The peaks of the dotted line rise 
more rapidly than the solid grey line.  The same is true for the number of new FIT clients, where 
the barely noticeable upswing during the recession is more pronounced at the quarterly 
frequency.  Comparing the same quarter, the number of new clients rose by 38% from 490 in 
2008Q1 to 676 in 2010Q1 or by 18% from 349 in 2008Q3 to 413 in 2010Q3.  From the fourth 
quarter in 2010 the number of new firms starts declining again. 
  The composition of firms asking for export promotion support also shows a number of 
patterns over the crisis.  Firms that are not (yet) exporting account for an increasing share of 
total support.  This fraction rises from 41% to 49% of all clients in Belgium and from 64% to 71% 
in Peru.  From 2009 onwards, this share declines again.  Among Belgian exporters, the use of 
export support services shifted slightly towards low-volume exporters, firms only serving extra-
EU destinations, and firms only exporting a single product or serving only a single destination. 
6. Empirical model 
After providing background information on the evolution of exports and the use of export 
promotion services during the 2009 crisis, we now evaluate whether export promotion can be 
linked to the rapid recovery in export sales that we documented.  In principle, three avenues are 
possible to make causal inferences.  One could assume firms select into treatment at least 
partially based on unobservables.  Consistent estimation of the treatment effect is then possible 
with an instrumental variable that is correlated with this selection, but not with the residual in 
the performance regression.  Alternatively, and the predominant strategy followed by the 
existing literature in this area, one can rely on the selection-on-observables assumption.  Simple 
controls, matching techniques or probability-weighted regressions are then used to construct an 
appropriate benchmark for supported firms.
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A third identification strategy is to conduct a randomized control trial.  Atkin, Khandelwal, 
and Osman (2014) used this to study the impact of exporting on firm performance.  They split a 
large order from a foreign buyer into smaller orders which they offered to a random subset of 
small rug manufacturers in Egypt.  As the researchers themselves control the assignment, they 
generate random variation in export opportunities which guarantees exogenous variation in 
treatment.  While this approach achieves clean identification, it is not without its own problems.  
It is inherently difficult to generalize from a single experimental study conducted in one specific 
environment.  For example, out of the 149 firms they approached, only 28 agreed to participate 
and, in a way, enter the export market.  Given the very low ex-ante export propensity of the 
sample population, it is unclear whether this take-up rate is high or low.  To keep the costs of 
the study manageable, micro firms were targeted, but they are quite different from the majority 
of firms that export promotion agencies work with.  Finally, contacting a producer with a one-
time offer to fulfill an export order differs from a typical export promotion intervention aimed at 
establishing international relationships and opening up avenues for future expansion.
16
  Given 
the challenges in carrying out a program like this, which are well documented in the paper, 
statistical assumptions are likely to remain our main source of identification. 
A generic performance regression would look something like this: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .       (1) 
The α coefficient will inform us whether firms that receive support (𝑆 = 1) achieve higher 
exports (𝑦), conditional on a set of time-varying control variables (𝑍) and fixed effects (𝛾).  The 
main challenge to infer causality from this regression is self-selection into treatment by firms 
with better export potential even in the absence of support.  With non-random selection, the 
support dummy will be correlated with the error term.   
As mentioned, the standard solution in the export promotion literature (which we follow) is 
to assume that conditional on a set of covariates, selection into treatment is random.  More 
specifically, we assume that conditional on a set of observables the export performance of client 
and other firms would have been the same in the absence of support (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). In the potential outcome notation, we assume that 𝐸[𝑦0|𝑍, 𝑆 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑦0|𝑍, 𝑆 = 0].  
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 Another statistical tool from the treatment evaluation literature, regression discontinuity design, has 
not been used in this particular literature because in most countries all firms qualify for support. 
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 It should be noted that this study was not designed to learn about export promotion.  While 
informative about the specific setting and the small firms’ reluctance to enter the export market, the 
broader relevance for the success of export promotion is limited. 
Combined with the law of iterated expectations, 𝐸[∙] = 𝐸𝑍{𝐸[∙ |𝑍]} , this is all we need to 
estimate the average treatment effect on treated firms, defined as 𝐸[𝑦1 − 𝑦0| 𝑆 = 1]. 17 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide an overview of the state of the art how to perform 
the crucial conditioning.  The simplest way is to include the appropriate set of control variables 
directly in equation (1).  They also discuss more sophisticated estimators which often involve 
estimating a treatment selection model in a first step and calculating the propensity score, i.e. 
the predicted probability of treatment, for all firms.  To investigate which firm-level observables 
are correlated with support, we estimate the following selection model: 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .    (2) 
We estimate equation (2) using a linear probability model which allows the inclusion of 
firm-fixed effects (𝛾𝑖), in addition to firm-level observed covariates (Z) and a time fixed effect.  
We also estimate a variant of this model replacing the firm-fixed effects with additional firm-
level covariates and sector-fixed effects.  The estimates provide direct insights whether the firms 
that ask for support are systematically different and whether the timing of support can be linked 
to observables, including the past export performance.
18
 
The equations we estimate to identify the effect of export promotion on export performance 
differs from generic equation (1) in several respects.  They take the following form: 
 I(Exports𝑖𝑡 > 0) = 𝛼1 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖06𝛽 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,          (3) 
ln (Exports𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼2 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖06𝛽 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.                (4) 
Some adjustments are motivated by our specific objectives, others reflect insights from the 
preliminary estimates of equations (1) and (2).  We discuss them in turn. 
We only observe the performance of existing exporters and are only interested in the 
effectiveness of export promotion during the crisis.  Therefore, our sample only includes firms 
that were exporting in 2006 and we evaluate how they perform in the following years.  Both 
equations are estimated on a cross-section of firms and instead of firm and time-fixed effects we 
now include sector-fixed effects 𝛾𝑆.  We consider two dependent variables: a dummy variable 
for the export status of firm i in year t and, on the subset of export market survivors, the 
logarithm of a firm’s export level in year t.  If supported firms are more likely to survive on the 
export market, the 𝛼1 coefficient will be positive.  Conditioning on export market survival, the 
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 𝐸[y]  is the expected export performance and the superscripts 0 and 1 indicate the potential 
outcomes under either treatment regime for a given firm.  Naturally, if a firm is supported we do not 
observe 𝑦0 and we need to estimate it from a group of control firms (which have 𝑆 = 0). 
18
 We later use a comparable specification, without the firm-fixed effects, to predict the propensity 
score. 
𝛼2 coefficient measures whether client firms are able export a higher volume than firms not 
receiving support. 
We run separate regressions for years t ∈{2008, 2009, 2010} which makes it straightforward 
to analyze changes at the extensive and intensive margin in a symmetric way.  The treatment 
variable of interest only focuses on support during the crisis.  It indicates whether firm i 
benefitted from export promotion support at any time between 2007, the year before the start of 
the global crisis, and year t: Any_Support𝑖𝑡 = max(Support𝑖07, … , Support𝑖𝑡).
19
  
We first estimate equations (3) and (4) with ordinary least squares, but to verify robustness 
we also implemented a matching estimator that selects a comparison firm from the non-clients 
based on the propensity score.  This is estimated using the following treatment model: 
Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖06𝛽 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .     (2’) 
As a further robustness check we also use the inverse of the propensity score directly as weights 
in the regression, an estimator that has a double-robust property (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  
It yields consistent estimates if either the selection model or the treatment model is correctly 
specified.  As the optimal weighting scheme is derived for the linear case, we estimate equation 
(3) as a linear probability model, assuming a mean-zero and i.i.d., but otherwise unrestricted 
error term. 
As both performance regressions as well as the selection model uses only a cross-section of 
firms, we cannot use firm or year-fixed effects, and lagged values are also of limited use.  
Variables included in the Z vector as control variables are the value of exports, number of 
products, and number of destinations, all from 2006, and other firm characteristics like an 
import dummy, size, and age (for Peru) in addition to the set of industry dummies.  At the same 
time, conditioning on positive exports in 2006 makes supported and control firms already more 
alike than a random selection of firms would be.   
Researchers often include firm-fixed effects in the performance regression which gives the 
comparison between treated and other firms a difference-in-differences interpretation (e.g. Görg, 
Henry and Strobl, 2008; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2008).  It is then only necessary to 
make the selection-on-observables assumption conditional on the firm-specific unobservable.  
However, the evidence for Canada in Van Biesebroeck et al. (2015) suggests that firms often 
turn to export promotion agencies after they have experienced a negative export shock.  If this is 
the case, including a firm-fixed effect by itself will not suffice to control for unobservables that 
lead firms to self-select into treatment and additional conditioning is necessary.  Our estimates 
of the generic performance equation (1), reported in Figure 4, indicate that it is particularly 
important to control for a pre-treatment (and pre-crisis) growth rate in exports. 
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 Berman et al. (2012) provides evidence that time-to-ship plays an important role during financial 
crises, making more distant trading relationships more vulnerable.  Hence, we look at treatment up to year 
t, the year as the performance variable, rather than only looking for effects of lagged treatment. 
A final specification is estimated on the same set of firms active on the export market in 
2006, but it includes separate observations for each export destinations a firm served in 2006.  
We again investigate whether supported firms are more likely to survive and export more, but 
now evaluate this on each export-destination separately.  In this formulation, we can again 
include a firm-fixed effect, but only if we observe some variation across destinations in the 
explanatory variable of interest.  We obtain this across-country variation by interacting the 
Any_ Support𝑖𝑡  variable with an indicator whether a particular destination experienced a 
financial crisis (FinC) over the same period that we measure export promotion support.
20
 
  Equations (3) and (4)  thus become  
I[Exports𝑖𝑑𝑡 > 0] = ?̃?1 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 × FinC𝑑(2007,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡,      (5) 
ln (Exports𝑖𝑑𝑡) = ?̃?2 Any_ Support𝑖𝑡 × FinC𝑑(2007,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡, (6) 
The firm and destination fixed effects absorb the uninteracted effects of both variables as well 
as the earlier control variables Z.  The coefficient on the interaction between the two indicators 
will be positive if support is particularly effective in destinations hit by a financial crisis. 
7. Results 
7.1 Control for self-selection 
To investigate which firms ask for export promotion support, we first show results for the linear 
probability model (2) with a time-varying support dummy as dependent variable.  In the first 
two columns (for each country) in Table 3 we include several dimensions of firms’ average 
export market engagement in the regression, but no firm-fixed effects.  As these variables are 
highly collinear, we do not find consistent patterns for the two countries, although many 
variables are statistically significant.  In Belgium the number of years exported and the number 
of destinations are particularly important, while in Peru a high export volume or number of 
products is associated with support.  If only a single dimension is included, for example the 
average export value, its coefficient is positive and highly significant in both countries.  
[Include Table 3 approximately here] 
One consistent pattern for the two countries is that firms that receive support in one year are 
also more likely to receive support in the next year.  In the regressions without firm-fixed 
effects, the coefficient on lagged support is positive, rather high, and very precisely estimated.  
If the average probability a firm asks for support is absorbed by the fixed effect, results in the 
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 We use the union of the country-year specific indicators from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) to measure incidences of banking or financial crises in the 2007-2010 period. 
next two columns, the sign reverses in both countries.  Conditional on receiving support more 
than once, firms prefer to space them out and not receive support in successive years.
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We included both lagged levels and lagged growth rates of export market attachment, but 
most of these do not have any predictive power for firms’ support status.  Point estimates tend 
to be very small and few are statistically significant.  The one variable that shows a consistent 
positive effect for both countries and across specifications is the number of lagged destinations.  
Firms exporting to many countries are significantly more likely to ask for support.  Even when a 
firm-fixed effect absorbs the average number of destinations, firms are more likely to request 
support if they served an above average number of destinations the previous year.  In contrast, 
we do not find any evidence that a decline in export levels, number of products or destinations is 
followed by a request for support to recover the lost ground.  Self-selection into support based 
on past performance seems to be rare. 
The few firm characteristics we observe do not yield any surprises.  Belgian firms that export 
both within and outside the EU are more likely to ask for support, as do firms that import goods 
as well.  Large Belgian firms are more likely to ask for support, but a firm-fixed effect accounts 
entirely for this effect.  In contrast, in Peru only the time-varying dimension of firm size is 
correlated with support implying that firms hire more workers at the same time as they turn to 
PROMPERU for assistance to expand abroad.
22
   
The relatively high R-squared statistics indicates that there are indeed observable differences 
between supported and other firms and some of these factors are likely to be related to 
subsequent export performance.  We will include the different dimensions of export market 
attachment as well as other firm characteristics in all performance regressions.  Moreover, we 
estimate a probit model on the subset of firms included in the performance regressions to 
calculate the propensity score for each firm.  These estimates are reported in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. 
A second set of results that informed our preferred performance specification is reported in 
Figure 4.
23
  We estimated equation (1), regressing export volume on support, additionally 
including leads and lags of the support indicator relative to the moment of support (time t), i.e. 
we replace  by a linear combination ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝑘
+𝐾
𝑘=−𝐾  with K=4 for Belgium and K=3 for 
Peru.  By including firm-fixed effects in the regression, exports are normalized to zero in the 
treatment year.  As the sample includes firms that never receive support and the equation 
includes calendar year dummies, the estimates represent the difference in the evolution of 
exports for clients relative to non-clients leading up to and following export support.   
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 To control for a downward bias in the estimate of the lagged dependent variable, see Nickell (1981), 
we also used the xtlsdvc procedure in Stata which confirmed the negative point estimates. 
22
 Because of data limitations we measure firm size by the value of fixed assets in Belgium and by 
total employment in Peru, both in logarithms. 
23
 The exact coefficient estimates with standard errors are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
[Include Figure 4 approximately here] 
The black markers with solid lines are for new clients, i.e. firms that receive export support 
for the first time at some point in the 2006-2011 period.  While they record higher exports 
following their first support in both countries, the export trajectory leading up to year t was 
already significantly different for new clients.  The low level of exports in years t-4 to t-1, both 
for Belgian and Peruvian firms, suggests that firms do not show up randomly at the export 
promotion agencies.  Even though the point estimates on the first two lags are often insignificant, 
consistent with the evidence in Table 3, the longer time trend is informative.   
We observe higher exports after t and lower exports before t, but in the short sample period 
we cannot rule out that exports merely return to their ‘normal’ level and support in year t was 
motivated by a temporary export slump.  When we estimate these evolutions year by year, we 
do find particularly low export levels in year t-1 for firms supported in 2008 and 2009 at the 
onset of the global trade collapse.  The patterns are similar in both countries, but less 
pronounced in Peru, both on the negative side ex-ante and on the positive side ex-post. 
The dashed lines show comparable estimates on a sample of continuous exporters.  The 
standard errors are lower as mature exporters see less pronounced swings in foreign sales.  The 
lower export levels leading up to treatment are also less notable for Belgian firms and entirely 
absent for Peruvian firms.  Finally, for Belgium we also observe the intensity that firms use 
export promotion services within each year. The grey markers shows the evolution of exports 
leading up to and following a spike in support, defined as a doubling in annual support instances 
(or a tripling in case the firm used the services only once in the preceding year).  We now 
measure the relative export evolution for existing clients that decided to work more intensively 
with the export promotion agency.  The evolution, including the pre-treatment export growth, is 
highly similar to that of new clients. 
Our takeaway from these graphs is that merely including firm-fixed effects in the 
performance regression may not adequately control for self-selection.  There is a systematic 
trend in supported firms’ exports even prior to treatment.  At a minimum, we need to include 
export growth in the pre-support period as an explicit control in the performance regressions, in 
addition to the firm characteristics and export market attachment discussed earlier. 
7.2 Effects of export promotion on export level and export status 
Following the initial evidence that motivated our preferred specification, we now report our 
estimates for the impact of export promotion on firms’ export performance in Tables 4 to 6.  In 
each table we show results for both export status and export volumes as dependent variables (in 
the top and bottom panel) and for both Belgium and Peru (left and right).  The sample is limited 
throughout to firms that were exporting already in 2006. 
The baseline results, in Table 4, are estimated with ordinary least squares and include control 
variables for firms’ export market attachment in 2006, the growth rate of exports between 2006 
and 2007, and several firm characteristics.  Of the twelve coefficients on the support variable, 
eleven are estimated positive and statistically significantly different from zero.  The uniformly 
positive estimates indicate that firms receiving support are indeed more likely to continue 
exporting over the crisis, in panel (a), and that their export values are also higher than for 
control firms, in panel (b).   
[Include Table 4 approximately here] 
For Belgium, the unconditional probability of export market survival is 65% in 2008 and 55% 
in 2010.  Receiving export promotion raises this probability on average by one twentieth in 
2008, but almost by one sixth in 2010.
24
  These effects are economically large and for Peru they 
are estimated even larger, at one seventh in 2008 and one third in 2010.  The control variables, 
especially prior export growth, indicate that a stronger initial export intensity raises the 
likelihood of survival on the export market, as expected.  Without the firm characteristics the 
point estimates on the support variable were approximately twice as high, but export promotion 
has a strong positive effect even after conditioning on observables. 
To accommodate the different reporting thresholds for exports within and outside the EU for 
Belgian firms, we added an interaction term between the support dummy and an indicator for 
firms that report some EU exports.  These firms tend to be a lot larger as the reporting threshold 
is much higher for intra-EU trade.  The results indicate that the benefits of export support for 
firm survival come almost entirely from the extra-EU activities of smaller exporters.  The 
interaction term is always strongly negative and in the first two years it negates the entire 
baseline effect.  Only for the estimates in 2010 is there a significantly positive effect for intra-
EU exporters, estimated at 5%—the sum of the point estimates on the uninteracted and 
interacted support indicators. 
There is a difficulty, however, interpreting these results.  The more positive estimates on 
export market survival for firms only exporting extra-EU could be due to a stronger effect for 
further-away destinations or for smaller exporters (which due to reporting threshold are only 
observed exporting extra-EU).  As a robustness check, we re-ran the regressions recoding all 
export-status dummies to zero if the total export value, combining intra and extra-EU trade fell 
below the €1 million threshold.  Unfortunately, these results are inconclusive.  For 2008 and 
2009, the effect on survival for firms also exporting intra-EU is positive and significant, while it 
is not significantly different from zero for firms only exporting extra-EU.  In 2010, however, the 
results flip, with positive and significant effects only for firms exporting solely extra-EU. 
At the same time, if the more positive effects on survival on extra-EU compared to intra-EU 
markets are not due to distance, but due to stronger effects of export promotion for smaller 
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 We obtained these probability increases combining the effect for intra-EU and extra-EU exporters.  
The average point estimates in the three years are 0.033, 0.048, and 0.080, which are reported in Table 5 
where we pool all supported firms.  
exporters, the total effects for Belgium might be underestimated.  Many small exporters only 
serving other EU markets might enjoy positive effects of this program, but as we do not observe 
them, the point estimates on the intra-EU effects only reflect the experience of larger exporters.  
This could be one reason why the intra-EU effects are lower than those estimated for Peru. 
The boost to the level of exports, reported in panel (b), is equally impressive.  Relative to 
control firms that did not receive support, export levels are approximately 20% higher.  Only in 
2008 for Peru is the coefficient markedly lower and insignificant.  Except for this one outlier all 
point estimates are estimated remarkably similar and they are never significantly different.  The 
persistence in export performance is even more pronounced, as can be seen from the control 
variables, but support was very important as well. 
As the earlier results indicated that treated firms are systematically different from control 
firms (in Table 3) and that treated firms already experienced systematically higher export 
growth leading up to support (in Figure 4), we also used two estimators that control more 
flexibly for potential endogeneity in treatment.  Estimates in Table 5 use propensity score 
matching and inverse probability weighting to control for self-selection.  These results confirm 
the earlier estimates.  Supported firms record stronger export performance during the crisis, 
although in most cases the absolute performance differences are estimated slightly lower with 
the more sophisticated estimators.  We included the same set of control variables in the 
regressions underlying Table 5 as in Table 4, but we do not report them as the estimates are very 
similar. 
[Include Table 5 approximately here] 
The nature of the analysis in Tables 4 and 5 did not allow the inclusion of firm-fixed effects 
in the specification.  We next exploit export performance differences by destination which 
makes it possible to control for an unobservable firm effect when investigating the effects of 
export promotion support.  In particular, we investigate whether supported firms are more likely 
to survive than control firms particularly in destinations that are hit by the financial crisis.  
These estimates control more flexibly for each firm’s average performance and identify the 
effect of export promotion solely from better than average performance in destinations hit by the 
crisis. 
The results in Table 6 suggest that supported firms indeed export more to crisis-destinations.  
In panel (a) we follow a standard approach to keep zero-trade observations in the sample, using 
the logarithm of total exports plus one as dependent variable.
25
  Firm-destinations thus remain in 
the analysis even if a firm exits a particular export market.  The implicit assumption is that the 
marginal effects of support (in percentage) is the same on the extensive and the intensive 
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 In practice, we add €100 to Belgian exports (the minimum threshold we used for a trade flow to be 
included in the sample) and $100 to Peruvian exports before taking logarithms.  
margins.  The average effect is estimated to be strongly positive in both countries in all three 
time periods we consider.  
[Include Table 6 approximately here] 
These results are based on a specification with a full set of firm and country fixed effects to 
control flexibly for unobservable differences that are time invariant.  Using the earlier firm 
characteristics as controls, the point estimates were extremely similar to the firm-level intensive 
margin estimates in Table 4(b), which is intuitive.  In the next two panels of Table 6, we 
investigate whether the superior performance of supported firms is due to a higher survival 
probability in destinations hit by the financial crisis or to higher export volumes in relative 
terms—in practice, this is likely to mean a smaller reduction in export volumes in those 
destinations. 
The results unequivocally pinpoint the extensive destination margin as the primary channel 
responsible for the superior firm-level performance. Supported firms are significantly more 
likely to remain active in affected destinations, even though their export volumes are not 
significantly different from control firms that survive there are well.  We estimate the strongest 
effect, both for Belgium and for Peru, in 2009, when the financial crisis and the trade collapse 
was most pronounced.  In Peru, the point estimates at the intensive margin are large as well, but 
the high standard errors makes two of the three estimates statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.   
The final results in Table 7 illustrate the value of repeated support.  The support dummy in 
the performance equations is replaced by two dummy indicators, one for firms that received 
support only once in the period considered and a second for firms receiving support multiple 
times.  It allows the effectiveness of export promotion to vary with the intensity that firms 
request export promotion support.   
At the extensive margin the results are striking and highly robust.  Firms that receive support 
more than once see a much more pronounced increase in their export market survival 
probability.  For Belgium some of the single-support dummies even turn negative.  Few clients 
of FIT, approximately only one in six, receive support in only a single year and these are clearly 
not the most promising exporters.  At the intensive margin, repeated support also provides a 
stronger boost to export volumes, but the results are not as consistent as at the extensive margin.  
For Belgium results are very strong at the firm level, but not at the firm-destination level.  For 
Peru the pattern is reversed, with extremely high and robust estimates at the firm-destination 
level.  
[Include Table 7 approximately here] 
We also estimated a specification where the dummy variable for “any” export promotion 
support is replaced with “the number of years” a firm received support.  The results (available 
on request) are very similar to the benchmark results in Tables 4 and 6.  The point estimates are 
lower, but given that the average for the explanatory variable is higher, they imply similar 
average effects of support.  At the firm-destination level, the statistical significance of the point 
estimates is strongly enhanced.  At the extensive margin, five of the six estimates are now 
statistically different from zero at a 1% significance level and even the effect for t=2008 for 
Peru becomes marginally significant.  The same is true for the intensive margin estimates which 
all turn positive and all but one becomes statistically significant.   
A final specification that could only be estimated for Belgium uses the total number of 
support instances, allowing for multiple instances within a year.  Those effects show positive, 
but much less significance and the point estimates varied a lot more in magnitude. 
Overall, the results suggest that repeated support helps to solidify the positive effects on 
exports.  But increased support intensity seems most useful when received consistently in 
successive years, rather than in large burst within a year. 
8. Policy discussion 
Our estimates provide rather consistent evidence that firms receiving export promotion support 
during the crisis performed better.  They were more likely to remain active on export markets 
and exported higher volumes relative to control firms.  The most robust channel for this better 
relative performance was a higher likelihood to remain active exporters in export destinations 
that were directly affected by the financial crisis. 
In this last section, we take a step back and consider the policy relevance of these findings.   
In particular, we address the following two questions.  Is it likely that systematically scaling up 
these programs during a cyclical downturn would provide additional beneficial?  Are the net 
benefits of these programs, taking also their costs into account, also positive? 
A priori, it is unlikely that these types of programs could become one of the major policy 
tools to cushion the business cycle fluctuations that exporters face.  The existing programs are 
minuscule in comparison to aggregate export sales.  The activities they perform are also not 
easily adapted to provide rapid interventions or adjust with the business cycles.  The primary 
role of these agencies is to act as information broker and help firms deal with problems of 
asymmetric information or transaction costs.  To accomplish this they invest in accumulating 
internal knowledge and a foreign network of support offices that is permanently available. 
Moreover, most support is initiated by client firms and pushing support to potential or 
current exporters is unlikely to generate positive effects of a similar magnitudes as those we 
estimated from the current operations.  It is notable, however, that the type of activity that saw 
the second strongest increase over the crisis period are actions, which is the category where the 
agency is most able to take initiatives itself, e.g. organizing seminars or trade missions (this 
breakdown is only available for Belgium).
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 Unsurprisingly giving the tightened credit constraints, the “Subsidy” category increased the most. 
Another caveat is that in the 2009 recession, government deficits soared and budgets for 
existing government services were tightened.  Without dedicated funds to adjust their activities, 
the agencies were limited in their responses to the crisis.  The effects we estimated relied on 
information from a time period where the agencies were especially constrained to engage in 
additional activities, given that they still had to cover their fixed costs. 
Having said that, a number of patterns we documented are encouraging for the 
countercyclical potential of this type of programs.  First, effects were stronger for exports 
outside the EU for Belgium, while most exports for Peru leave the region.  As business cycles 
tend to be less synchronized for countries that are farther apart it provides an opportunity to tap 
into markets where demand is not depressed during a domestic recession.
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Second, effects were particularly strong at the extensive margin.  As exporting involves sunk 
entry costs and fixed costs to remain active overseas, providing export promotion support 
especially when firms’ budgets to cover recurring fixed costs is tight, it can avoid inefficient 
export market churn.  The especially robust results at the destination-extensive margin further 
underscore the benefit of export promotion as a way to diversify sales and help hedge against 
local business cycle fluctuations. 
Third, the evidence also showed that export promotion in particular helps firms survive in 
export markets that experienced a financial crisis.  This is not surprising as exporting tends to be 
a capital and credit intensive activity.  We expected export promotion to be effective as well to 
help firms navigate protectionist measures that often become more popular during cyclical 
downturns.  In the last recession, countries have been remarkably restrained in this area and we 
did not find sufficient such instances to test this prediction.   
Finally, the results on treatment intensity do provide suggestive evidence that providing 
more support could also raise benefits.  The results (only for Belgium) using the intensity of 
support within a year were somewhat ambivalent, but receiving support year-after-year did 
generate especially strong benefits.  This cannot be dismissed as simply picking up unobserved 
exporter quality, as it also held in the firm-destination level estimates that included firm-fixed 
effects. 
While our results provide strong evidence for a positive impact on export performance at the 
micro level, it is possible that the costs associated with these programs still outweigh the 
benefits. Obviously, to carry out a complete cost-benefit analysis one would require detailed 
information on the variable and fixed costs involved in providing these services, especially on 
the marginal support provided.  It would also require an assessment to what extent provided 
services merely crowd out private expenses and to what extent a public program permits firms 
to avoid duplicating costs.  At the benefit side, it would matter greatly whether supported firms 
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 Note, however, that the extra-EU trade flows are subject to a much lower reporting requirement.  
The stronger effects on survival extra-EU could also be caused by stronger effects of export promotion 
for smaller exporters. 
are able to reap long-term benefits or not.  Perhaps most importantly, the net welfare benefit to 
society of an extra dollar or euro of export sales is hard to know, especially given that it is likely 
to be higher during recessions. 
We can make two observations, though.  If we trust the point estimates, the potential gain 
from these programs could be huge.  Aggregate export sales are in the range of €300 billion for 
Belgium and US$50 billion for Peru.  Boosting this aggregate by 20%, the average estimate on 
the intensive margin from Table 4, would translate into an enormous amount.  Even if only a 
tiny fraction of these additional sales are counted as a welfare benefits, the programs will pay 
for themselves multiple times over.  Especially in a cyclical downturn, anything that stimulates 
effective demand is valuable.  It is, however, impossible to know how the efficiency of the 
program would evolve if it were rolled out to all exporters. 
A more limited approach to assess the net benefits, would be to make some reasonable 
assumptions and perform a simple ‘back of the envelope’ calculation based on our estimates and 
the export promotion budget of these agencies.  For example, we can focus on the return on 
investment purely from the government’s perspective.  The narrow question we ask here is:  
Does the additional tax revenue on corporate profits from exporters cover at least the budget of 
the export promotion agency?  
The numbers we use in this calculation are (i) the unconditional probability that firms 
surviving on the export markets, (ii) the percentage gain in exports for supported firms from 
Table 4(b), and (iii) the exports from firms additionally surviving on the export market thanks to 
the support they received from Table 4(a). As a conservative estimate, we only consider the 
additional business income tax as personal income tax gains would require assumptions on 
exports per employee and which jobs would be net additions in the economy. We apply the 
profit margin that we observe in the annual accounts of exporting firms, which varies between 
3.5% in 2008 and 2010 and 2.1% in 2009, and the effective corporate tax rates we use are 24% 
for Belgium and 20% for Peru. 
In this narrow sense, we find a positive net benefit of the export promotion program on 
government revenues for Peru in the years 2009 and 2010 and for Belgium in all years. In 
particular, when we use the most conservative point estimates from Table 5, we find that the net 
gain in government revenue (corporate tax revenues minus cost of the export promotion 
program) varies in Belgium between €5.1 million in 2008 and €41.6 million in 2010.  For Peru,  
the net return is largest in 2010, with a net revenue of €2.7 million.28  While this simple cost-
benefit calculation indicates that export promotion is covering its own costs, the net gain in 
government revenue remains modest, which is what we would expect.  
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 Given the negative or very low point estimates at the intensive margin for 2008, the net effect in 
2008 cannot be positive. 
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Figure 1:  Long-term evolution of aggregate exports
Belgium Peru
100
150
200
250
300
350
1997 2001 2005 2009 2013
Actual Fitted
0
10
20
30
40
50
1999 2003 2007 2011
 Actual  Fitted
(a) Extensive versus intensive firm margin
(b) Extensive versus intensive product or destination margin
(c) Small versus large exporters
(d) Intra-region versus distant exports
Belgium Peru
Figure 2: Evolution of exports over the crisis by adjustment margin, firm size or destination
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Figure 3: Evolution of export promotion activities over the crisis
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Figure 4:  Evolution of exports prior and following export promotion instances
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Source: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets 
from each country and supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Note: New clients refer to support instances that are a firm's first in the 2006-2011 period.  A support spike is a 
doubling of support instances in a year; for firms only receiving support once, a spike is only registered if support at 
least triples. Regressions include firm, sector, year-fixed effects and other controls. Coefficient errors and standard 
errors are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 1:  Summary of the literature evaluating the impact of export promotion programs
Country Study
Argentina Castro and Saslavsky (2010)
United States Coughlin and Cartwright (1987)
United States Bernard and Jensen (2004)
Cross-country Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2010) 
Japan Hayakawa, Lee and Park (2011) 
Netherlands Creusen and Lejour (2012)
South Korea Hayakawa, Lee and Park (2011) 
Spain Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano, and Requena-Silvente (2008)
Spain Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano, and Requena-Silvente (2014)
Cross-country Volpe Martincus, Estevadeordal, Gallo, and Luna (2010)
Cross-country Volpe Martincus, Carballo, and Gallo (2011)
Argentina Volpe Martincus, Carballo and Garcia (2012)
Austria Seringhaus and Botschen (1991)
1
Belgium Schminke and Van Biesebroeck (2014)
Brazil Cruz (2014)
Canada Seringhaus and Botschen (1991)
Canada Francis and Collins-Dodd (2004)
1
Canada Van Biesebroeck, Yu, and Chen (2014)
Chile Álvarez and Crespi (2000)
Chile Álvarez (2004)
Chile Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010b)
Colombia Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010a)
Costa Rica Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2012)
France Crozet, Mayer, Mayneris, and Mirza (2013)
Peru Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008)
Spain Cansino, Lopez-Melendo, Pablo-Romero, and Sanchez-Braza (2013)
Tunisia Cadot, Fernandes, Gourdon, and Mattoo (2015)
United Kingdom Mion and Muûls (2015)
Uruguay Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010c)
Cross-country Volpe Martincus (2010)
Cross-country Lederman, Olarreaga and Zavala (2015) 
Denmark Schaur and Munch (2015)
United Kingdom Rincón-Aznar, Riley and Rosso (2015)
Chile Álvarez, Crespi, and Volpe Martincus (2014)
The Impact of Firm-Level Export Promotion: New Dimensions
Notes: 
1
 Effectiveness is gauged from firms' responses to a survey.
Macro Perspective
Export Promotion Measure: Financial Resources Devoted to Export Promotion
Export Promotion Measure: Network of Foreign Offices
Micro Perspective
The Impact of F´irm-Level Export Promotion on Firms Export Outcomes
Table 2:  Composition of the sample
Only export Only receive 
support
Export & 
support
Only export Only receive 
support
Export & 
support
Observations:
2006 20,824 1,552 2,200 6,101 656 371
2007 20,535 1,609 2,210 6,252 1,001 420
2008 21,384 1,752 2,249 6,639 1,228 508
2009 19,819 1,983 2,302 6,862 1,188 560
2010 18,878 2,288 2,432 7,033 999 490
2011 18,034 1,919 2,075 7,373 937 579
2006-2011 119,474 11,103 13,468 40,260 6,009 2,928
Firms
2006-2011 40,027 4,761 5,793 16,330 4,586 1,831
Source: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets 
from each country and supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Belgium Peru
Number of firms that Number of firms that 
Table 3: Which firms select into treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged support 0.608*** 0.606*** -0.085*** -0.156*** 0.441*** 0.461*** -0.044*** -0.026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019)
Lagged export level (log) -0.0014* -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006*
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Lagged export growth 0.0009 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged products (no.) -0.0001** -0.0001** 0.0002* 0.0001 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged products growth 0.0002* 0.0001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged destinations (no.) 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0005** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002** 0.007*** 0.010***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Lagged destinations growth 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.001 -0.006***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.002)
Export intra & extra region 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Importer dummy 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.009*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Size 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 -0.0004 0.002 0.002 0.015*** 0.018***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
Age 0.004 -0.003 0.015 -0.040
(0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.030)
No. of export years (log) 0.021*** 0.040*** -0.001 -0.003*
(0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
Mean export value (log) -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean no. of products (log) -0.003** -0.003** 0.030*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean no. of destinations (log) 0.025*** 0.027*** -0.003 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.448 0.449 0.720 0.745 0.224 0.271 0.558 0.582
No. of observations 80,477 54,619 80,477 54,619 26,905 16,966 26,905 16,966
Source: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets from each 
country and supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is a time-varying dummy variable for export promotion support
Table 4: Effect of export promotion on export status during the crisis
(a) Firm extensive margin effect
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Supported at least once in 2007-2008 0.116*** 0.074***
(0.015) (0.014)
Supported at least once in 2007-2009 0.113*** 0.133***
(0.007) (0.015)
Supported at least once in 2007-2010 0.130*** 0.154***
(0.013) (0.016)
Supported * some exports within-EU -0.121*** -0.093*** -0.080***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015)
Export value in 2006 (log) 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Export growth in 2006-2007 0.188*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.179*** 0.137*** 0.113***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of products in 2006 (log) 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of destination in 2006 (log) 0.035* 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.004 0.004 0.009
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Export intra & extra region 0.008 0.047*** 0.054***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Importer dummy 0.065*** 0.090*** 0.096***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Size in 2006 (log) -0.006** -0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.021*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age in 2006 (log) 0.169*** 0.184*** 0.188***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 23,024 23,024 23,024 6,268 6,268 6,268
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the 
firm level for year t
Belgium Peru
Table 4 (continued)
(b) Firm intensive margin effect
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Supported at least once in 2007-2008 0.184*** 0.033
(0.027) (0.055)
Supported at least once in 2007-2009 0.249*** 0.185***
(0.034) (0.058)
Supported at least once in 2007-2010 0.172*** 0.206***
(0.041) (0.064)
Export value in 2006 (log) 0.881*** 0.816*** 0.795*** 0.770*** 0.711*** 0.696***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Export growth in 2006-2007 1.152*** 0.966*** 0.915*** 0.697*** 0.565*** 0.463***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) (0.040)
Number of products in 2006 (log) -0.008 0.003 0.023 -0.097*** -0.149*** -0.168***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
Number of destination in 2006 (log) -0.014 -0.069*** -0.106*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.151***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.036) (0.041) (0.051)
Export intra & extra region 0.429*** 0.703*** 0.666***
(0.047) (0.063) (0.055)
Importer dummy 0.188*** 0.245*** 0.319***
(0.042) (0.064) (0.061)
Size 0.019*** 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.127*** 0.197*** 0.236***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022)
Age 0.044 -0.107 -0.143*
(0.057) (0.066) (0.082)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 14,958 13,743 12,742 3,495 3,015 2,658
Source: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets 
from each country and supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Note: (a) Sample of exporters in 2006, linear probability model.  (b) Sample of 2006 exporters that still export in year 
t .
dependent variable is log of firm-level exports for export market 
survivors in year t
Belgium Peru
Table 5:  Preferred estimates: effects using matching or propensity score weighting
(a) Firm extensive margin effect
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Coefficient on "Supported at least once in [2007, t ]"
- Benchmark (OLS) estimates 0.033*** 0.048*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.133*** 0.154***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
- Propensity score matching 0.041*** 0.066*** 0.086*** 0.068*** 0.113*** 0.131***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
0.042*** 0.052*** 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.126*** 0.141***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Number of observations 23,024 23,024 23,024 6,268 6,268 6,268
(b) Firm intensive margin effect
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Coefficient on "Supported at least once in [2007, t ]"
- Benchmark (OLS) estimates 0.184*** 0.249*** 0.172*** 0.033 0.185*** 0.206***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.041) (0.055) (0.058) (0.064)
- Propensity score matching 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.242*** -0.044 0.225*** 0.134*
(0.071) (0.067) (0.073) (0.078) (0.063) (0.081)
0.166*** 0.237*** 0.172*** 0.000 0.148*** 0.163***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.038) (0.051) (0.054) (0.062)
Number of observations 14,958 13,743 12,742 3,495 3,015 2,658
- Inverse probability weighting with 
regression adjustment
Source: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets 
from each country and supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Note: (a) Sample of exporters in 2006, linear probability model.  (b) Sample of 2006 exporters that still export in year 
t .  We always report the effect of treatment on the treated.  The same control variables as in Table 4 are included but 
not reported.  The propensity score used in these estimators is calculated based on the probit regressions reported in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at the 
firm level for year t
Belgium Peru
dependent variable is log of firm-level exports for export market 
survivors in year t
- Inverse probability weighting with 
regression adjustment
Table 6: Effect of export promotion at the firm-destination level during the crisis
(a)  Firm-destination total margin
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
0.347*** 0.500*** 0.344*** 0.690** 0.801*** 0.874***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.091) (0.329) (0.281) (0.269)
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 141,189 141,189 141,189 16,092 16,092 16,092
(b)  Firm-destination extensive margin
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
0.014** 0.024*** 0.007 0.037 0.044** 0.053**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 141,189 141,189 141,189 16,092 16,092 16,092
(c)  Firm-destination intensive margin
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c) (6c)
-0.015 -0.020 -0.036 0.168 0.262* 0.128
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.161) (0.152) (0.170)
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 91,207 83,062 76,538 8,182 7,049 6,333
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once 
& country d financial crisis in [2007, t ]
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once 
& country d financial crisis in [2007, t ]
Interaction: Firm i supported at least once 
& country d financial crisis in [2007, t ]
dependent variable is log(exportsdt +1)
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1) at 
the firm-destination level (dt )
dependent variable is log of firm-destination level (dt ) of 
exports for export market survivors
Belgium Peru
Table 7: Heterogeneous effects of export promotion by intensity of use
(a) Firm or firm-destination extensive margin effect
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Estimated at the firm level
One year of assistance in [2007, t ] 0.006 -0.016 -0.054*** 0.040** 0.077*** 0.105***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Multiple years of assistance in [2007, t ] 0.030** 0.054*** 0.100*** 0.024 0.082*** 0.122***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Number of observations 23,024 23,024 23,024 6,268 6,268 6,268
Estimated at the firm-destination level
-0.505*** -0.540*** -0.485*** -0.005 0.017 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.033) (0.028) (0.026)
0.203*** 0.175*** 0.131*** 0.074** 0.077*** 0.099***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.036) (0.028) (0.026)
Number of observations 141,189 141,189 141,189 16,092 16,092 16,092
(b) Firm or firm-destination intensive margin effect
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Estimated at the firm level
One year of assistance in [2007, t ] -0.076* -0.079 -0.185*** 0.031 0.230*** 0.192**
(0.041) (0.053) (0.059) (0.072) (0.067) (0.078)
Multiple years of assistance in [2007, t ] 0.220*** 0.278*** 0.232*** 0.056 0.122 0.216***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.047) (0.068) (0.081) (0.080)
Number of observations 14,958 13,743 12,742 3,495 3,015 2,658
Estimated at the firm-destination level
-2.117*** -1.956*** -1.886*** -0.083 0.163 -0.109
(0.098) (0.157) (0.197) (0.251) (0.195) (0.230)
0.049 0.001 -0.023 0.353** 0.378** 0.311*
(0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.177) (0.179) (0.184)
Number of observations 91,207 83,062 76,538 8,182 7,049 6,333
dependent variable is a binary export status indicator (0/1)
Interaction: One year of assistance & 
Financial crisis in [2007, t ]
Interaction: Multiple years of assistance 
& Financial crisis in [2007, t ]
Peru
Belgium Peru
Interaction: One year of assistance & 
Financial crisis in [2007, t ]
Interaction: Multiple years of assistance 
& Financial crisis in [2007, t ]
dependent variable is log of firm or firm-destination exports for 
export market survivors in year t
Belgium
Table A.1:  Probit estimate of the selection regression used to calculate the propensity score
t=2008 t=2009 t=2010 t=2008 t=2009 t=2010
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Export value in 2006 (log) -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.035*** 0.025* 0.021* 0.029**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Export growth in 2006-2007 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.312***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022)
Number of products in 2006 (log) -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 0.110*** 0.133*** 0.127***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Number of destination in 2006 (log) 0.396*** 0.379*** 0.357*** 0.139*** 0.206*** 0.232***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037)
Export intra & extra region 0.120*** 0.135*** 0.165***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Importer dummy 0.352*** 0.375*** 0.389***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
Size 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.021 0.029** 0.030**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Age 0.125** 0.185*** 0.219***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.045)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 23,024    23,024    23,024    6,268 6,268 6,268
dependent variable is a binary support indicator at the firm level 
for any export support in the [2007, t ] interval
Belgium Peru
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
t-4 -0.242 0.072 -0.087 0.065 -0.225 0.077
t-3 -0.195 0.055 -0.082 0.052 -0.193 0.057 -0.137 0.067 0.038 0.058
t-2 -0.062 0.045 -0.075 0.044 -0.080 0.048 -0.114 0.055 0.027 0.047
t-1 -0.108 0.038 -0.032 0.038 -0.031 0.043 -0.038 0.050 0.027 0.046
First (t) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.065 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.025 0.044 0.024 0.050 0.069 0.044
t+2 0.113 0.043 0.103 0.043 0.074 0.047 0.050 0.060 0.075 0.048
t+3 0.137 0.050 0.166 0.048 0.090 0.054 0.004 0.084 0.130 0.071
t+4 0.036 0.064 0.123 0.058 0.168 0.070
Table A.2:  Coefficient estimates underlying Figure 4
Year 
relative 
to first 
support 
instance
support spike 
(continuous 
exporter)
new clients      
(all)
new clients  
(continuous 
exporters)
Belgium
Source: Own calculations based on matched firm-level information from administrative trade-transactions datasets 
from each country and supported-client datasets from each export promotion agency.
Note: New clients refer to support instances that are a firm's first in the 2006-2011 period.  A support spike is a 
doubling of support instances in a year (not observed in Peru); for firms only receiving support once, a spike is only 
registered if support at least triples.  Dependent variable is log(exports) and all regressions include firm, sector, year 
fixed effects and controls for size, importer dummy, dummy for exports within and outside the region.
Peru
new clients             
(all)
new clients 
(continuous 
exporters)
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